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INTRODUCTION
With the World Trade Organization's ("WTO") "Development
Round" of negotiations in full swing, trade liberalization as a
mechanism for poverty reduction has resumed a central place in
international policy analysis. Developing-country governments are
pressing for the removal of trade barriers from developed-country
markets, arguing that such barriers not only contravene the spirit of a
• Professor of Law, Fordham Law School. Comments are welcome at:
cthomas@law.fordham.edu. Thanks to Padideh Ala'i and Raj Soopramanien for
helpful comments. Special thanks to the editors of the American University
International Law Review, and especially. Joel Blank and Maki Tanaka, for their
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liberal international trade order, but stand as devastating obstacles to
the developing-country pursuit of economic growth and
modernization.
These negotiations unfold against a backdrop of emphasis within
contemporary international economic discourse on trade
liberalization as a critical tool of growth in poor countries. While the
WTO's Members are right to address development in the current
negotiations, the relationship between trade and development bears
investigation. This investigation resonates with the more general
inquiry into globalization and its relationship to global poverty.
The questions of whether trade and globalization are either
beneficial or harmful are too often over-simplified. While the claim
for greater complexity hardly seems radical, too often more strident
claims supercede it. This essay stakes a claim for attentiveness to the
complexities of globalization in the contemporary, and of trade as a
solution to poverty. In the context of current negotiations over trade
and development, such attentiveness is of critical importance.
The first part of this essay recounts the debate over whether
globalization has exacerbated global poverty.' It concludes that while
some fears are overstated, even advocates of globalization have
found that the poorest countries have not fared well in this era. The
second part of the essay turns to the question of trade liberalization
as an engine for development.2
This essay examines some of the concepts that seem to underpin
the premise that an increase in trade will lead to a decrease in
poverty, and finds them often oversimplified.3 Trade does harbor
massive potential for growth - but if poor countries are to harness
this massive growth potential, however, that potential often must be
yoked to other dynamics: economic and political "building blocks"
1. See infra Section I (outlining the debate over poverty and globalization).
2. See infra Sections II & III (discussing trade liberalization and methods of
development).
3. An outcrop of recent scholarship has sought to complicate the relationship
between trade and growth. This scholarship goes beyond the question of the impact
of trade on poor countries specifically, to argue that trade liberalization in general
is a "neutral" factor - that is, it neither guarantees nor prevents growth. Joel Paul
has argued that trade always creates winners and losers, preventing the ability to
predict definitively that trade will increase overall welfare.
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that may be prerequisites for trade success, and a strong regional
orientation.
Could human rights, and particularly "social, cultural and
economic rights,"4 provide a means of addressing poverty reduction
goals? International human rights law and international economic
law have evolved more or less separately for most of the postwar era.
The longstanding divisions between the two spheres have only now
begun to break down. The potential of human rights as tools of
poverty reduction, particularly in the international trade context,
appears still largely untapped.'
I. POVERTY AND GLOBALIZATION
If export orientation does not by itself reduce poverty, does it
cause poverty? In the contemporary political frame, some elements
of an "anti-globalization" movement have suggested that a focus on
international integration harms local economies; particularly poor
ones.6 Studies examining the relationship between poverty and
outwardly oriented trade policy, however, have found it to be more
complex.7
A. RELATIVE POVERTY AND GLOBALIZATION
In 1999, the United Nations Human Development Report of 1999
("HDR"), undertook a massive study of globalization, and linked
inequality with globalization in both the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries. The HDR challenged the notion that globalization creates a
4. The title of the panel for which this paper was submitted was "Trade and
Social, Cultural and Economic Rights."
5. See infra Section IV.
6. See, e.g., Sylvia Ostry, Why Has "Globalization" Become a Bad Word?,
The Alcoa-Intalco Works Distinguished Lecture, Western Washington University
16, (October 25, 2001) (noting that the current trend tends to impact developing
countries more seriously than developed countries), available at
http://www.cbe.wwu.edu/cib/papers/ostry.pdf (last visited September 9, 2003).
7. See U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT
1999, 2-3 (Oxford Univ. Press 1999) [hereinafter HDR] (examining the
relationship between globalization and poverty), available at
http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/1999/en/pdf/hdr_1999_full.pdf (last visited
August 1, 2003).
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rising tide that lifts all boats, arguing that instead of convergence, the
most recent era of globalization "has shown increasing concentration
of income, resources and wealth."' Such concentration manifests
itself in the gap between the richest and poorest nations rising from
three to one in 1820 to seventy-four to one in 1997. 9 The HDR is
replete with statistics evincing the stark disparities between rich and
poor in global opportunity, including the striking statistic showing
that the richest twenty percent of the world account for eighty-six
percent of global GDP, while the poorest twenty percent account for
only one percent. 0
It is worth noting that the HDR's analysis was not universally
accepted. An October 2000 study by the Norwegian government, for
example, disputed the HDR's conclusions." The study argued that
the HDR's own data indicate that inequality across countries has
decreased since 1993.12 Moreover, the study challenged the HDR
methodology 3 and argued that, according to its own data adjusted for
purchasing power parity, "international income inequality has
decreased continuously from the last part of the 1960s until 1997."'"
Even if aggregate global inequality has decreased, however, there
seems to be general agreement that the aggregate improvement
8. Id. at 3.
9. See id. (stating that "the income gap between the fifth of the world's people
living in the richest countries and the fifth in the poorest was 74 to I in 1997, up
from 60 to I in 1990 and 30 to I in 1960 ... [Moreover,] the income gap between
the top and bottom countries increased from 3 to I in 1820 to 7 to 1 in 1870 and 11
to I in 1913.").
10. See id. at 2 (finding that the wealthiest twenty percent make up eighty-six
percent of the world's GDP, while the poorest twenty percent make only one
percent of the world's GDP).
11. See ARNE MELCHIOR ET AL., GLOBALIZATION AND INEQUALITY: WORLD
INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND LIVING STANDARDS, 1960-1998, 1 (Royal Norwegian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2000) (concluding that global inequality as a whole has
decreased since the 1960s), at
http://odin.dep.no/archive/udvedlegg/O1/0l/rev_0I6.pdf (last visited July 18,
2003).
12. See id. at 2 (maintaining that the HDR's data shows a decrease in income
inequality in the 1990s).
13. See id. (explaining that the HDR data was not adjusted to reflect the
differences in purchasing power of income in different countries).
14. Id.
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conceals more disturbing trends within groupings of countries. The
Norwegian government report, for example, conceded that although
world inequality decreased between the top and bottom third of the
world population, inequality increased between the top and bottom
ten percent. 5 As a WTO-sponsored report observed: "[i]t is an
empirical fact that the income gap between poor and rich countries
has increased in recent decades."'16
B. ABSOLUTE POVERTY AND GLOBALIZATION
It might be the case that the increase in inequality arises because,
while globalization has made everyone better off, globalization has
made the rich even better off than the poor. The concerns arising out
of this scenario would differ from one in which the increase in
inequality has arisen in part because the poor are worse off than
before. If globalization is a rising tide lifting all boats but some more
than others, we are less concerned than if globalization pushes some
boats under water.
As observed above, there is general agreement that, on average,
world income has increased over time, even if the gap in relative
income - that is income inequality - has also grown between the top
and bottom of the spectrum.'7 But the same countries have
experienced not only a relative decrease in income, but also an
absolute decrease.' 8 When one looks at certain groupings of countries
15. See Melchior et al., supra note 11, at 12 (remarking that a comparison
between the top and bottom third of countries shows a decrease in inequality, but a
comparison between the top and bottom ten percent of countries shows an increase
in income inequality, and the lowest ten percent of the world population had a
higher share of world income in 1965 than in 1997).
16. HAKAN NORDSTROM, TRADE, INCOME DISPARITY AND POVERTY: AN
OVERVIEW, WTO SPECIAL STUDIES SERIES #5 3 (Dan Ben-David et al. eds., 2000)
[hereinafter WTO Report].
17. See HDR, supra note 7, at 22 ("During 1990-97 real per capita GDP
increased at an average annual rate of more than 1%."); see also Melchior, supra
note 11, at 17 (noting that for the "poorest part of the world population ...
[a]lthough their share of world income declined.., income increased on average")
(emphasis in original). Although most countries experienced a substantial income
increase, the regions of Sub-Saharan Africa, and Eastern Europe experienced a
reduction in income. Id.
18. See HDR, supra note 7, at 22 ("During 1990-97 real per capita GDP
increased at an average annual rate of more than 1%."); see also Melchior, supra
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in particular Eastern Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa - income has
decreased. 9 Moreover, whereas the Eastern European countries
started out at relatively high levels of income, in many Sub-Saharan
African countries' pre-existing desperation has simply intensified.2"
Not only have many of these countries experienced a decline in
income, but they have also experienced starkly downward trends in
life expectancy,2' due in part to HIV epidemics.22 Thus, it appears
that although average income has increased, the poorest are worse
off now than ever before:
[w]hile convergence at the top end of the spectrum is of the
catching-up variety - where the poorer group members catch-
up with the wealthier group members - the convergence at the
bottom end of the income spectrum is one of negative growth
by the initially better-off members of the poorest range.23
II. POVERTY AND TRADE: QUALIFICATIONS TO
EXPORT ORIENTATION AS A GROWTH
STRATEGY
If the world's poorest countries have not fared well under
globalization, might increased emphasis on growth through trade pull
note 11, at 17 (noting that the average income in the poorest parts of the world
actually increased, although their share of the world's income decreased).
19. See id. at 154 (listing declining GDP per capita income figures for Sub-
Saharan Africa and Eastern Europe from 1985-1997).
20. See id. at 151, 154 (explaining that Eastern Europe declined on average
from 2,913 to 1,989 US $1987, whereas the average medium-income 1997 GDP
per capita was $935). Sub-Saharan African income declined from an average of
542 to 518, and the income of the least-developed countries, most of which are in
sub-Saharan Africa, declined from 277 to 245 dollars. Id. at 154.
21. See id. at 165-66 (showing the negative movement of life expectancy in
Eastern Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa).
22. See Dr. Rene Loewenson, HIV/AIDS Implications for Poverty Reduction,
U.N. Development Programme (prepared for the U.N. General Assembly Special
Session on HIV/AIDS, 25-27 June 2001) (providing a study of countries worst
affected by HIV/AIDS, the vast majority of which were located in Sub-Saharan
Africa), available at
http://www.undp.org/dpa/frontpagearchive/2001/june/22juneOl /hiv-aids.pdf (last
visited July 31, 2003).
23. WTO Report, supra note 16, at 18.
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them towards the "catching-up" convergence that typifies the better-
off countries? The conviction that trade is an engine of growth finds
subscribers across the political spectrum and across the geographical
divide. It is this conviction that animates many of the negotiations -
and controversies - within the WTO.
While trade can spark economic growth, however, the relationship
is not an unqualified one. This section examines some of the familiar
tenets of policy discourse on trade and development, notes some
shortcomings, and highlights factors that are important co-dynamics
in the link between trade on the one hand and economic growth on
the other.
The classical economic theory of comparative advantage counsels
countries to export in their sectors of relative economic strength.24
Comparative advantage provides the theoretical foundation for
"export-oriented" trade policy and its promise to spark economic
growth and improve national welfare.25  Within development
discourse, it is widely accepted that the countries that have achieved
industrialization in the post-World War II have done so through
export orientation.26 Japan and the Southeast Asian "tigers" in
particular, exemplify the path of industrialization through export led
growth. 7 The export successes of these countries have served as
confirmation of the comparative advantage principle, and translated
into a directive for other countries to focus on export orientation.28
24. See Alice O'Brien, Countervailing Low Wage Subsidies: A Counter to the
Leveling of Labor Conditions, 4 TRANSNAT'L L & CONTEMP. PROBS. 825, 869
(1994) (finding that, "[b]y allowing countries to concentrate their efforts in their
most efficient sectors, trade enhances global and domestic economic well-being").
25. See J.M. Migai Akech, The African Growth and Opportunity Act:
Implications for Kenya's Trade and Development, 33 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 651,
657-58 (2001) (noting that the comparative advantage theory promotes exports
which benefits developing countries by employment and production creation).
26. See Alan S. Gutterman, Japan and Korea: Contrasts and Comparisons in
Regulatory Policies of Cooperative Growth Economies, 8 INT'L TAX & Bus. LAW.
267, 283 (1991) (explaining that the classical model for economic development
advocates for developing countries to adopt a policy of export orientation).
27. See id. at 285 (noting that early Japanese and Korean economic success
seemed to be a result of export-oriented policies).
28. See id. (observing the early Japanese and Korean economic successes that
resulted from export-oriented policies).
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Preliminarily, it is worth noting that the success enjoyed by the
export-led industrializing countries did not fit squarely with the
classical theoretical account. These countries all experienced
significant periods of "inward-looking" growth prior to the turn
outwards. Moreover, their export-led growth often occurred not
through the "invisible hand" of the market isolating sectors of
comparative advantage, but instead through directed industrialization
policies.2 9 With these qualifications, however, it is nonetheless clear
that the primary engine for growth indeed resided in export-oriented
trade.
The puzzle is that, if one looks at the countries that are currently
the world's poorest, it becomes clear that many of them have also
been highly dependent on export revenues as a source of income. If
export orientation is defined as the extent to which a national
economy is dependent on exports, many Sub-Saharan African
nations are more export-oriented than export-led growth success
stories. Sierra Leone, which ranked 174th out of 174 countries in the
1999 HDR, earns more from exports as a percentage of its GDP than
does Hong Kong.3" Guinea-Bissau (168th) is more export-oriented in
this fashion than South Korea.3' Indeed, overall exports as a
percentage of GDP approach thirty percent in Sub-Saharan Africa,
compared with nineteen percent for the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development ("OECD") countries.32 If exporting is
so key to development, how can the most export-dependent countries
be so poor?
29. See id. at 285-86 (illustrating that Japan and Korea based their regulatory
framework on "the pursuit of strategic industrial objectives" in lieu of a
comparative advantage approach); see also STEPHAN HAGGARD, PATHWAYS FROM
THE PERIPHERY: THE POLITICS OF GROWTH IN THE NEWLY INDUSTRIALIZYING
COUNTRIES 26-27 (Peter J. Katzenstein ed., Cornell University Press 1990) (stating
that, although "the government might rely on market signals of changing
comparative advantage, it might also anticipate or lead changes in the industrial
sector by targeting particular industries.").
30. See HDR, supra note 7, at 45 & 48 (showing the export percentage of GDP
index for Hong Kong's index of 218 compared to Sierra Leone as 273).
31. See id. at 48 (comparing the index of Guinea-Bissau of 384 to the Republic
of Korea's index of 185).
32. See id. at 2 (commenting that countries in Sub-Saharan Africa are highly
globally integrated with exports accounting for thirty percent of GDP compared to
OECD countries' exports nineteen percent).
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Successful export-oriented countries benefited from a number of
factors that do not feature as prominently elsewhere in the
developing world. First, benefited from very stable political regimes.
Second, they benefited from relatively egalitarian income
distributions predating the export orientation strategies. Third, they
profited from a significant level of infrastructural development as
well as capital infusions on relatively generous terms. Fourth, they
benefited from a high degree of regional integration. Finally, they
participated in a particular kind of export - manufactured goods as
opposed to agriculture.
To compare the East Asian with the Sub-Saharan African states on
these factors is to see telling contrasts. The Sub-Saharan African
states suffered from, and continue to suffer from, high intra-country
inequality. Many suffer, or have suffered, from debilitating political
turmoil, which in turn has bred parasitic corruption.33 Infrastructural
development remains low, as does low-cost capital infusion.
Regional integration remains the lowest on the globe. And finally,
the exports in question are primarily agricultural, and thus subject to
much more volatility - and fiercer competition - than manufactured
exports.
Assessing the comparative histories of high-growth and low-
growth regions in the developing world, it is possible to fashion an
equation that, though necessarily rough and generalized, nonetheless
captures a greater level of complexity in the relationship between
trade strategy on the one hand and growth on the other. In this
equation, it is possible to see that the level of growth may depend not
only on the type of trade, but on a host of political and economic
factors that create an environment in which trade can flourish.
33. See International Finance Corporation, Sub-Saharan Africa: Building Local
Capacity and Regional Businesses (2002) (describing political conflict as a factor
that constrains economic development in Africa), at
http://www.ifc.org/ar2002/regional/africa.htm (last visited July 17, 2003).
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THE DEVELOPMENT EQUATION
AVAILABLE CAPITAL POLITICAL STABILITY EXPORTS
GROWTH Foreign aid Indigenous Basic Government
capital territorial capacity to
stability direct
economic
activity
LOW Relatively low Low Low Low Commodities
MEDIUM Relatively low Medium Medium to Low to Commodities;
High Medium Manufactures
HIGH Relatively Medium to High High Manufactures;
I high High Services
If this equation is correct, a singular focus on export orientation or
liberalization or global integration obscures the importance of other
factors, both domestic and international, that may determine the
extent to which a strategy of growth through international trade,
whether imported or exported, will be beneficial.34
A. TRADE "PREREQUISITES"
Domestically, a host of conditions appear to increase the
likelihood that exporting will lead to economic growth. These
include: infrastructure and basic social services, capital of all kinds
(physical, financial, and human), and political stability.35 Leaving
these other factors out of the equation significantly distorts the real
importance of trade.36
Dani Rodrik, for example, has warned against focusing on
international economic integration as a policy goal, at the expense of
34. See Melchior et al., supra note 11, at 32 (explaining that other important
events occur simultaneously with globalization, and may affect the extent of
inequality between countries). Political and technical changes in Eastern Europe
and Sub-Saharan Africa strongly affect the countries' economies. See id.
35. See id. at 32 (maintaining that other factors such as political stability, and
technological change strongly affect global competition and income disparity
between different countries).
36. See id. (concluding that one must take these other factors into account in
order to derive causal links between globalization and inequality).
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infrastructural development.3" Two recent Nobel laureates, Amartya
Sen and Joseph Stiglitz, have each urged a development policy
perspective that better integrates the goal of economic liberalization
with a broader array of goals related to social progress. Even leading
proponents of free trade have affirmed this need. Jagdish Bhagwati,
for example, has observed the importance of suitable policy
intervention to correct market failures that otherwise obstruct gains
from trade.3"
B. REGIONAL TRADE
In addition to these domestic factors, it is worth pointing out the
very strong correlation between regional trade and economic growth.
As one study has noted, "[i]f 'globalization' is taken to imply
relatively more trade with other regions of the world economy, it
paradoxically looks as if Africa is the most 'globalized' - and
increasingly so."39 In 1990, trade with other regions constituted
ninety percent of foreign trade in Africa, as compared with fifty
percent and less than thirty percent for Asia and Western Europe
respectively.40
37. See Dani Rodrik, Trading in Illusions, FOREIGN POLICY, March/April 2001,
at 55 (stating that the trend of integration, in place of development, is "bad news
for the world's poor"). Rodrik argues that when governments focus on
international integration, "governments in poor nations divert human resources,
administrative capabilities, and political capital" away from more important areas
of development, such as education, health, and industrial capacity. Id.
38. See Jagdish Bhagwati, Free Trade: What Now?, Address delivered at the
University of St. Gallen, Switzerland International Management Symposium, (May
25, 1998) (advocating that gains from trade are possible when market failures are
fixed through suitable policy intervention), available at
http://www.columbia.edu/-jb38/papers/freedom-speech.pdf (last visited June 26,
2003); see also Jagdish Bhagwati, The Demands to Reduce Domestic Diversity
Among Trading Nations, in 1 FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION 9, 24 (Jagdish
Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec, eds., 1996) (explaining "[i]f markets do not function
adequately because of specific domestic institutions ... or the entire domestic
economic system ... then free trade rules as contemplated by the GATT system
would fail to produce the desired gains from trade").
39. Id. at 33.
40. See id. (charting the percentage of trade with countries outside the region as
a share of foreign trade).
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III. EXPANDING THE SCOPE OF POLICY
PRESCRIPTIONS FOR GROWTH
If these conclusions are true, what response might the international
trade order posit? On the surface, this claim for complexity might
appear to deflate the urgency around current negotiations within the
WTO on lowering trade barriers in developed-country markets to
agricultural exports from developing countries. This article is
certainly not intended to suggest that such negotiations are not
appropriate or are irrelevant. They deal with markets of enormous
economic significance, and also with bedrock principles of the
international trade order.
This article does suggest, however, that even if developing country
governments succeed in gaining all the market access concessions
they desire, without gaining more, these concessions may not yield
meaningful economic and social progress.
Regionalization of trade factors heavily into sustainable economic
growth. To what extent should the trade order take responsibility for
fostering regional economic integration? The General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") already has a special rule allowing for
regional agreements.' The GATT also adopted a special waiver for
trade preferences accorded between developing countries.4 In fact,
this led to the signing of many regional agreements. African regional
and sub-regional agreements include the African Economic
Community, the Economic Community of West African States, the
Economic Community of Central African States, and the South
African Customs Union.43 Regional organizations elsewhere in the
developing world include the Carribean Community, the Central
41. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. XXIV, 61
Stat. A-I 1, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT] (explaining that the
provisions of the Agreement shall not prevent the formation of a customs union or
of a free-trade area).
42. See Differential and More Favourable Treatment Reciprocity and Fuller
Participation of Developing Countries, Nov. 28, 1979, GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.)
at 191 (1980) [hereinafter Differential and More Favourable Treatment] (declaring
that parties may accord differential treatment to developing countries).
43. See Joseph L. Brand, The New World Order of Regional Trading Blocs, 8
AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 155, 173-76 (1992) (listing the regional trading
organizations and member countries).
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American Common Market, the Common Market of the South, and
the Andean Common Market.4 The same factors that hinder growth
through trade generally, unfortunately, also seem to have prevented
many of these agreements from bearing fruit. The time may therefore
have come for a renewed emphasis on the importance of regional
trade.
Such an emphasis would require confronting the tension between
the goals of a global trading regime and the significance of regional
trade. Many commentators have worried that regional trade blocs
could trigger protectionism not seen since World War 11.11 The
irrefutable significance of regional trade for economic development,
however, forecloses the possibility of escaping this tension.
If regional trade presents a tricky issue for the WTO, the proper
relationship between trade law and trade "prerequisites" seems to do
so infinitely more. To what extent should the trade order take
responsibility for infrastructure and basic social services, capital of
all kinds (physical, financial, and human), and political stability?
Such domestic development goals could be seen as falling outside
the purview of the WTO and belonging more to institutions such as
the International Monetary Fund ("IMF"), the World Bank, and the
regional development banks.
Domestic development is, however, a stated goal of the WTO. It is
recognized by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,46 and
44. See id. at 177, 179-81 (listing the regional trading organizations and
member countries).
45. See Robert L. McGeorge, An Introduction and Commentary: Revisiting the
Role of Liberal Trade Policy in Promoting Idealistic Objectives of the International
Legal Order, 14 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 305, 314 (1994) (asserting that a system
consisting of highly regionalized trading blocs would create a situation "that that
would look hauntingly familiar to the architects of the post-World War II
international order."); see also Bruce J. Janigian, Global and Regional Trade
Developments, 15 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 99, 100 (2002) (stating that many countries
would rather see emphasis placed on reduction of global trade barriers rather
regional barriers to "break the threat of growing protectionism and regionalism").
46. See GATT, supra note 41, art. XVIII (stating that "[t]he contracting parties
recognize that the attainment of the objectives of this Agreement will be facilitated
by the progressive development of their economies").
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emerges in the aspirational language of the new agreements within
the WTO.47
It is quite clear that many occasions exist in which the application
of a trade rule will differ depending on whether such domestic goals
are taken into account. One example of this is the proper scope of the
WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights
("TRIPS Agreement"). In the area of patent law, for example, the
TRIPS Agreement recognizes the principle in a longer
implementation period for developing countries, essentially imposing
an outlying deadline of 2005 for developing countries, as opposed to
1996 for developed countries.4 8 The longer transition period,
however, does not sufficiently reflect the socioeconomic disparities
between developed and developing countries, so that the resulting
regime still strongly falls in favor of developed-country
pharmaceutical industries.49
The building global resistance to patent monopolies over HIV-
related medicines in the context of HIV epidemics in the poorest
47. See Decision on Measures in Favour of Least-Developed Countries (Dec.
15, 1993) (recognizing the WTO's commitment to special and differential
measures for least-developed countries), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docse/legal-e/31-dlldc.pdf (last visited August 1,
2003); see also Preferential Tariff Treatment for Least-Developed Countries, June
15, 1999, WT/L/304 (allowing preferential tariff treatment to products of least-
developed countries), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/waiverl999_e.htm (last visited August
1,2003).
48. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Apr. 15, 1994, art. 66, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex IC, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND VOL.31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS] (granting developing-
country WTO Members ten years to comply with the Agreement's patent rules).
The TRIPS Agreement essentially imposes a deadline of 2005 for developing
countries as opposed to 1996 for developed countries. Id.
49. As Jagdish Bhagwati has observed, intellectual property rights seek to
"trade-off between gains from more innovation under IPR and gains from diffusion
of given innovation without IPR. But ... few believe that the optimum IPR...
extends as high as the 20-year patent rule that was forced into the World Trade
Organization by the business lobbies!" Jagdish Bhagwati, Economic Freedom:
Prosperity and Social Progress, Keynote Speech at the Conference on Economic
Freedom and Development in Tokyo (June 17-18 1999), at
http://www.columbia.edu/-jb38/freedomtokyo.pdf (last visited June 26, 2003).
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countries only serves to underscore this point.5" After a lengthy
struggle, the connection between public health policy and WTO law,
in the form of decisions by the WTO Membership explicitly
recognizing the right of developing-country governments to relax
patent rights when necessary to address public health crises."
The interrelatedness of social progress and trade expressed in this
set of decisions could be applied elsewhere in intellectual property
law. Some commentators have suggested a context-specific approach
to international intellectual property rights. Dru Brenner-Beck, for
example, has proposed a "threshold" approach that would require
developing countries to comply fully with international intellectual
property law only if they had reached the threshold socioeconomic
levels requisite to their domestic economic actors to benefit from it.52
The administrability challenge posed by determining such a
threshold is certainly not inconsiderable, but the concept may be both
more efficient in maximizing gains from the law and more just.
These intellectual property issues present just one category of a
wide array of issues on which development policy might affect the
application of a WTO rule. I have discussed elsewhere the balance-
of-payments exception for developing countries. 3 Balance-of-
payments crises occur when severe downward pressure on a
50. See, e.g., Sheryl Gay Stolberg, AIDS Drugs in Africa: If Cedes to When,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2001 (noting that pharmaceutical companies are in
negotiations over patent rights and the price of AIDS medicines), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/03/1 0/health/ IOAIDS.html?ei=5070&en=25b30ce8
0b365963&ei=5070 (last visited June 26, 2003).
51. See WTO Ministerial Decision of 20 November 2001
(WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2), Declaration on the TRIPs Agreement and public health;
Council for TRIPS, Decision of 30 August 2003 (WT/L/540), Implementation of
paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and public health;
see also James T. Gathii, Construing Intellectual Property Rights and Competition
Policy Consistently with Facilitating Access to Affordable Aids Drugs to Low-End
Consumers, 53 Fla. L. REV. 727 (2001).
52. See Dru Brenner-Beck, Do As I Say, Not As 1 Did, 11 UCLA PAC. BASIN
L.J. 84, 103-04 (1992) (providing a detailed analysis of the "threshold level"
approach intellectual property laws and economic development in least-developing
countries).
53. See Chantal Thomas, Balance-of-Payments Crises in the Developing
World: Balancing Trade, Finance and Development in the New Economic Order,
15 AM. U. INT'L. L. REV. 1249, 1251 (2000) (describing a balance-of-payments
problem as a result of downward pressure on a country's currency value).
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country's currency combines with a deficit in that country's trade
balance.14 The GATT/WTO exception allows a developing-country
government to impose trade restrictions in order to stave off a
debilitating fall in its currency value.5 Although the GATT/WTO
exception for developing countries recognizes the special
vulnerability of such countries' economies to balance-of-payments
crises and is intended to provide such countries with relatively
greater leeway to impose trade restrictions, the exception is more
narrowly construed now, in the WTO-era trade regime, than
previously. 6 While the purpose of such narrow construction is to
prevent abuse of the exception, it may also deprive developing-
country governments of needed protection in today's volatile
international capital markets, as well as appropriate autonomy in
progressing towards liberalization. 7
The balance-of-payments case usefully demonstrates that the
WTO organs has the capacity to work closely with international
institutions more focused on domestic development policy, such as
the IMF. 8  Rather than limiting consideration of domestic
54. Id.
55. See GATT, supra note 41, art. XVIII, para. 9 (explaining that a country
may impose restrictions on quantity or value of imports in order to protect its
external financial position). See generally Thomas, supra note 53, at 1255-58
(discussing the GATT exceptions to quantitative restrictions on trade and balance-
of-payment exceptions).
56. See id. at 1275 (noting that the Uruguay Round created a movement away
from pragmatism and resulted in a more legalistic approach to trade).
57. See id. at 1277 (recognizing the importance of construing exceptions
narrowly but also recognizing social and political costs of narrow construction in
volatile capital markets).
58. With respect to financial capital, there is certainly a need for greater
international cooperation - a need which countries are increasingly coming to
recognize. For those countries industrialized enough to boast significant securities-
market activity, the threat of capital flight as seen in the Mexico peso crisis and the
Asian financial crises looms large-many, among them Nobel laureate James
Tobin and Jagdish Bhagwati, view increased regulation of international capital
flows in these markets as desirable. For poorer countries bearing heavy direct-debt
obligations to private and institutional lenders, the international coordination on
debt forgiveness has also been widely exhorted and is increasingly being
operationalized. See Joseph Kahn, Wealthy Nations Plan a Doubling of Debt
Relief, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2000 (discussing the debt-relief initiative), available
at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F00817F9345COC748DDDA0089
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development policy to assessment of disputed trade practices, the
trade regime could only benefit from a more in-depth consideration
of the interrelatedness of trade goals and domestic social objectives.
While gestures have been made in this direction, much more
attention is required to even begin to reach a sustainable balance.
IV. THE IMPORT (IN BOTH SENSES) OF HUMAN
RIGHTS
Can human rights law provide the bridge to gain that balance? Up
to this point in the article, there has been very little discussion on
human rights. The exclusion of human rights considerations thus far
reflects the real-world exclusion of human rights from international
trade law.
In recent years, however, the global community has devoted
increasing attention to examining the relationship between human
rights and trade.5 9 In particular, the "social, cultural and economic
rights" emerging in international law might provide just and effective
4D8404482 (last visited Aug. 3, 2003). And finally, some commentators have
noted that the IMF Articles of Agreement "explicitly empower the IMF to place
adjustment burdens on countries in chronic trade and payments surplus[,]...
[which] encourage such countries to transfer their surpluses through foreign aid
like the Marshall Plan grants that recycled the U.S. surplus to rebuild Western
Europe after the Second World War." Timothy A. Canova, Globalization or
Global Subordination?: How Latcrit Links the Local to Global and the Global to
the Local: Global Finance and the International Monetary Fund's Neoliberal
Agenda; The Threat to the Employment Ethic Identity, and Cultural Pluralism of
Latina/o Communities, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1547, 1556 (2000). The notion of a
Marshall Plan-like response to capital scarcity in poor countries is also reflected in
Thomas Pogge's proposal for a Global Resources Dividend. See generally Thomas
W. Pogge, A Global Resources Dividend, in ETHICS OF CONSUMPTION: THE GOOD
LIFE, JUSTICE, AND GLOBAL STEWARDSHIP 501 (David A. Crocker & Toby Linden
eds., 1998).
59. See generally Robert Howse & Makau Mutua, Protecting Human Rights in
a Global Economy: Challenges for the World Trade Organization (2000),
available at
http://www.ichrdd.ca/frame2.iphtml?langue=0&menu=m07&urlpage=store/ (last
visited September 9, 2003). For discussion of the larger question of "linkage"
between trade and "non-trade" issues, see Jose Alvarez (ed.), Symposium: The
Boundaries of the WTO, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (2002); Andrew Guzman,. Global
Governance and the WTO (manuscript on file with author); Chantal Thomas,
Trade-Related Labor and Environment Agreements?, 5 J. INT'L ECON. L. 791
(2002).
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controls on trade that would dovetail with many of the "trade
prerequisites" discussed above.
This section first discusses the laudable aspects of incorporating
human rights into international trade law. It then discusses three
concerns that this incorporation can raise: First, what human rights
are implicated? Second, what is the status of human rights in the
existing trade regime? And finally, what should the status of human
rights be?
A. THE BENEFITS OF INCORPORATING HUMAN RIGHTS INTO
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW
At the very least, incorporation of human rights into trade law
would reduce its curious isolation from the larger body of public
international law.60 But the designs of incorporation are much bolder;
they seek nothing less than to develop a language within
international trade law for discussing justice.
More than any other scholar, Amartya Sen has pioneered this new
language. Sen conceptualized respect for human rights as an essential
building block of domestic capacity to generate and sustain
economic growth.6' Human rights law also provides a framework for
measurement and assessment that fit well with the emphasis of
international development institutions on government accountability.
The rights framework thus created a widely respected and
acknowledged platform on which to discuss questions of social
justice. The World Bank thus declared on the 50"h Anniversary of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights: "The world now accepts
that sustainable development is impossible without human rights."62
60. See Joost Pauwelyn, The Role of Public International Law in the WTO:
How Far Can We Go?, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 535, 538-39 (2001) (noting that the
WTO, while generally under the guidance of many public international law rules,
has specifically contracted out some general principles of public international
laws). By re-incorporating human rights back into trade law, we will bring one area
previously "contracted" out back into the fold. Id. at 540.
61. See AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 148 (Alfred A. Knopf,
Inc. 1999) (stating that political and liberal rights play a constructive role in the
conceptualization of economic needs).
62. World Bank, Development and Human Rights: The Role of the World
Bank (1998), available at: http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/rights/.
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Moving beyond these analytical advantages to the broadest
normative level, a formally delineated relationship between human
rights and trade would emphasize the centrality of human dignity and
well-being to the international order. Article 1 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR") provides that "[a]ll human
beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights."63 Article 28
adds that "[e]veryone is entitled to a social and international order in
which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be
fully realized."64 The explicit incorporation of such principles could
help to keep the human face of globalization, to use a current phrase,
clearly in view.
Finally, a "negative" argument for incorporation is that without it,
the international trade order may directly or indirectly erode a
government's ability to recognize human rights. To the extent that
the pressures and/or opportunities arising from trade liberalization,
which in turn flows at least in part from international trade law, may
cause a government to reduce its attention to political, social,
economic, or cultural goods which international human rights norms
assure, there is a clear conflict between the two regimes that might
governments might best address by building more direct
relationships between them. (To wit, see the below discussion of
human rights and trade in Myanmar)6 5 Incorporation of human rights
may not only prevent declines in human rights enforcement, but may
also achieve gains through access to the relatively rigorous
enforcement mechanisms of international trade organizations.
Finally, the need to build links in order to prevent conflicts
between human rights and trade is a narrow expression of a broader
aspiration towards a more fully integrated global order. After all, the
international economic organizations were initially meant to be much
more closely related to the United Nations system. After half a
century of progressive development along separate tracks, perhaps
the time has come to begin again to connect the two.
63. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, art. 1 [hereinafter
UDHR], available at http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html (last visited July 11,
2003).
64. Id. art. 28.
65. See discussion infra Section IV.B. (discussing the attempt of the State of
Massachusetts to impose trade sanctions on Myanmar).
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B. CONCERNS ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS
Potentially all human rights are implicated in an agenda of global
economic justice, or, more narrowly, poverty reduction, and many
might be implicated in contradictory ways. As noted above, human
rights are often classified into first, second, and third generations: the
first referring to civil and political rights; the second referring to
social, economic, and cultural rights; and the third referring to more
diffuse rights such as the right to development (which simply restates
the question) and the right to a'sustainable environment. Leav ing to
one side the broader notion of human development and its
relationship to political rights, one might draw links between
political rights and poverty reduction insofar as political rights help
to provide political stability. On the other hand, to the extent that
political rights, particularly of expression and participation,
destabilize economic policies that governments otherwise view as
favorable to economic growth, such rights might actually stall
poverty reduction.66
The relationship between social, economic, and cultural rights
seems more straightforward. The right to work, to free choice of
employment, to just and favorable conditions of work, and to
protection against unemployment would seem directly to support a
poverty reduction agenda. 67 Again, however, one could view such a
right as contradictory in that it might require interventionist policies
that would be viewed as inimical to economic growth, and therefore
poverty reduction. One might say the same of third generation rights
such as the right to a sustainable environment.
Virtually no one now espouses the view that there is an absolute
trade-off in the allocation of government resources towards
achieving economic growth on the one hand, and fulfilling political
and social goods on the other. As discussed above, public provision
of certain kinds of such goods is often cited as a necessary
prerequisite to effective competition in the international marketplace.
66. See Chantal Thomas, Does the "Good Governance" Policy of the
International Financial Institutions Privilege Markets at the Expense of
Democracy?, 14 CONN. J. INT'L L. 551, 557-62 (1999) (discussing the extent to
which "democratic politics in developing countries are seen as defying, rather than
accepting, the liberal international economic order").
67. UDHR, supra note 63, art. 23(1).
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Indeed, discourse on sustainable development now emphasizes the
"indivisibility" of human rights.68
This discussion, however, does show how governments might
resist pressure to do so on the grounds that doing so will retard
economic growth and therefore poverty reduction. Moreover, even if
the general relationship between effective trade and trade
prerequisites is widely accepted, the relationship in particular
instances will undoubtedly be disputed. Where, for example, would a
generous unemployment scheme fall? Would it be viewed as
necessary to correct a market failure and therefore necessary to
effective participation in free trade? Or would it be viewed as
creating a market distortion, and therefore inimical to effective
participation in free trade? Does the right to protection against
unemployment include generous unemployment schemes, or only
minimal ones?
The relationship between social rights-related regulations and
trade is significant not only as a policy matter, but also as a legal
matter. The WTO regime abhors "disguised protectionism."
Opponents of incorporating human rights fear that they would
furnish a veil for protectionist trade strategies that would otherwise
violate WTO principles. The WTO dispute settlement body and trade
scholars are only beginning to delineate the contours of this question,
but the guiding principle must be in balance. While trade
liberalization lies at the center of the WTO's mission, its agreements
also articulate sustainable development as a goal. Because WTO law
provides a balance of rights and obligations, the way through the
thicket of "incorporation" or "linkage" questions is not to raze
human rights law.
If the WTO and international scholars could resolve the larger
substantive relationship between trade and human rights, it would
still leave a host of institutional concerns. 69 First, there is the not-
inconsiderable question of determining which human rights should
68. CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW,
INTERNATIONAL SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW: PRINCIPLES, PRACTICE &
PROSPECTS (2002).
69. Cf Thomas, supra note 59, at 791 (noting that even if the relationship
between trade and environmental rights were resolved, the "real difficulties of
legal form would arise").
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be candidates for incorporation, were one to view incorporation as
desirable. Although not completely satisfactory, one approach to this
problem would be to limit incorporated human rights to those that
can be narrowly or strictly construed, and which resist expansion.
The right to just and favorable conditions of work cited above would
be eschewed in favor of, for example, the right to protection against
forced labor.
Assuming one could resolve this question of content, an additional
challenge arises from the fact, as noted above, that state sovereignty
binds the internationil trade law much more than international
human rights law. As such, concern has arisen about the propriety of
a multilateral trade regime intervening in member states' human
rights practices. This concern seems spurious, however, since the
regime clearly already regulates a wide array of members' domestic
practices affecting international trade.
A potentially more powerful version of this concern is that
incorporating human rights into international trade law will create
institutional overload and meltdown. The idea is that because
member states have only limited tolerance, and the international
trade order accordingly has only limited institutional capital, nations
must expend such capital sparingly. Directly linking trade to human
rights would require too great an expenditure. One could bolster the
argument with the point that unfettered economic growth will enable
a society to realize all human rights than any other strategy, so that
the trade-off is only temporary. This is the nub of the U.S. executive
branch's policy of"de-linking" trade and human rights.
In addition to these familiar concerns, there are a set of concerns
that go less to institutional workability of human rights and more to
the underlying discursive structure. Setting aside the question of
"cultural bias" in human rights discourse,70 these objections to
human rights that are simply versions of common rights critiques -
objections to rights talk. One central such critique is the tendency of
rights to monopolize and reify policy discussion. Once the
international community introduces the language of rights, it is
70. See generally, e.g., Catherine Powell, Introduction: Locating Culture,
Identity, and Human Rights, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 201, 205-06 (1999)
(noting that many non-Western countries use cultural differences as a reason for
non-compliance).
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difficult to express those concerns that we cannot voice as rights
claims and thus these concerns tend to become marginalized.
Consequently, in order to avoid marginalization, all policy concerns
must be retooled into rights concerns. One explanation for the
increasingly multiplex array of emerging human rights, therefore, is
that once human rights became the only game in town for talking
about justice, the only way to keep justice claims afloat was to try to
convert them into claims specifically for human rights enforcement.
This phenomenon might not be worrisome,7 the critique goes, if
the discursive structure of a "right" was substantively neutral, an
empty vessel into which a government could inject any content with
the requisite (moral, political, or otherwise) backing. However, the
structure of a right lends itself more to certain kinds of claims - not
surprisingly, the traditional civil and political claims - than to others -
the relatively recent second and third generation claims.
The right to development is a good example. Development as a
policy matter, though nebulous, is viewed as universally desirable.
Once translated into a right, however, it becomes subject to all kinds
of objections: by whom is the right exercised? For whom? Against
whom? In short, the right, it has been argued, is non-justiciable.
Such non-justiciability has implications both for desirable policies
and for rights discourse. Desirable policies may get marginalized,
and especially aspects of policy obligations that fall outside the limits
of the right. In the international context in particular, the potential
obligations of governments other than the government whose
territory the rights claimant inhabits may be obscured by rights
discourse. Consider the right to "just and favorable conditions of
work"72 in the UDHR as a potential example of this dynamic.
The right highlights the obligations of, for example, India to
provide its citizens with just and favorable conditions of work. At the
same time, it obscures any obligation which accrues to the United
States - or citizens therein - to aid India in obtaining just and
favorable conditions of work. Thus, such a right, even if perfectly
implemented, would at most provide WTO authorization of U.S.
71. Leaving aside here questions of the actual and/or appropriate role of
instrumentalism in rights discourse.
72. UDHR, supra note 63, art. 23(1).
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trade sanctions on India for non-compliance with this right; India
could not (unless some dramatic overhaul of the traditional structure
of rights occurred) impose trade sanctions on the United States for
failing to aid India in fulfilling this right. Thus, the reconstruction of
poverty-reduction policies as rights might dramatically affect the
principle of global responsibility for poverty reduction. Do such
rights require obstruction of the principle of global responsibility?
Not at all - but they may nevertheless tend to cause it.
Perhaps for all of these reasons, human rights discourse has
foundered in free trade agreements (as opposed to customs unions
such as the European Union). The North American Free Trade
Agreement ("NAFTA"), for example, obliges member governments
to apply their labor and environmental laws, but does not provide any
real enforcement mechanism, nor does it require that those laws
accord with any recognized international rights norms.73 While many
governments have made certain WTO-related privileges, such as
market access, partially dependent on compliance with
internationally recognized worker rights, such incorporation is not
required by the WTO.7 4
The WTO is not without language relevant to incorporation of
human rights. The GATT contains two "social clause" provisions -
that exempt a WTO Member for restricting trade (subject to certain
conditions) in order to protect "public morals" or "human, animal, or
plant life or health." " These provisions would seem to offer a basis
for exempting Members from WTO liability for trade sanctions
imposed in connection with human rights abuses. A third "social
73. See generally North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8-17, 1992,
Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M. 289.
74. Recently, however, India initiated a complaint (now suspended) against the
EC charging that these conditions were discriminatory and violated WTO law. See
WTO Dispute Settlement Body, Complaint by India on conditions for the granting
of tariff preferences to developing countries (WT/DS246) (May 3, 2002). Robert
Howse's paper in this volume takes up that case in detail. See generally Robert
Howse, Back to Court After Shrimp/Turtle? Almost but not Quite Yet: India's
Short Lived Challenge to Labor and Environmental Exception in the European
Union's Generalized System of Preferences, 18 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1333 (2003).
75. GATT, supra note 41, art. XX.
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clause" provision - relating to products of "prison labor" - also seems
applicable.76
Earlier GATT decisions suggested that some of these provisions
applied only to a government's attempts to protect social rights
within its own territory, and did not apply extraterritorilly 7 The
WTO Dispute Settlement Body has since rejected that approach, but
only for global environmental resources." WTO Members have yet
to truly test the connection between international trade law and
human rights. In 1998, a law enacted by Massachusetts, enabling it to
impose government procurement restrictions on companies doing
business with Myanmar (formerly Burma), presented itself as a
potential test case when the European Union and Japan initiated
complaint proceedings in the WTO against the United States. The
issue was rendered moot, and the complainants suspended the
proceedings, when the law was rendered invalid on domestic
constitutional grounds.
In considering the relationship between international trade law and
international human rights law, then, it seems necessary to challenge
two, potentially countervailing, assumptions at once. The first is the
assumption that trade and human rights regimes should remain
separate. The second, however, is the assumption that human rights
should be the primary discourse for talking about global justice,
economic or otherwise.
CONCLUSION
In Section I, I investigated the links between global trade and
global poverty, and concluded that export orientation/liberalization
76. See id.
77. For fuller discussion of this quite nuanced question of legal interpretation,
see the sources listed in note 59 above; see also Maki Tanaka, Bridging the Gap
Between Northern NGOs and Southern Sovereigns in the Trade-Environment
Debate: The Pursuit of Democratic Dispute Settlements in the WTO under the Rio
Principles, 30 ECOLOGY L.Q. 113, 126 (2003) (noting that states lack authority to
control environmentally harmful activities in states outside their jurisdiction).
78. See Gregory Schaffer, The World Trade Organization Under Challenge:
Democracy and the Law and Politics of the WTO's Treatment of Trade and
Environment Matters, 25 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 80 (finding that following the
Appellate Body decision in the Shrimp-Turtle case, countries have increasingly
adopted environmental standards which affect international trade).
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do not guarantee poverty reduction. In Sections II and III, I
suggested changes to the international trade regime that might reflect
the complex, rather than unidirectional, relationship between global
trade and global poverty. Such suggestions included emphasis on
regional trade development, and intensifying work to secure the basic
socioeconomic conditions necessary for international trade
competitiveness.
Finally, in Section IV, I contemplated the potential significance of
human rights in relation to these goals and legal constructs. I
concluded that connecting human rights and trade can serve to
highlight the ultimately emancipatory objectives of trade
liberalization as well as to achieve desirable integration in
international law. I also observed the importance of foregrounding
the substantive goals of poverty reduction in relation to human
rights. More specifically, initiatives to obtain global justice should
not depend upon, although they can certainly include, a showing that
specific human rights require such.
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